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Abstract10
This paper proposes a planning model for power distribution companies (DISCOs)11
to maximize profit. The model determines optimal network location and capacity for12
renewable energy source, which are categorized as independent power production (IPP)13
and self-generation (SG). IPP refers to generators owned by third-party investors and14
linked to a quota obligation mechanism. SG encompasses smaller generators, supported15
by feed-in tariffs, that produce energy for local consumption, exporting any surplus16
generation to the distribution network. The obtained optimal planning model is able17
to evaluate network capacity to maximize profit when the DISCO is obliged to provide18
network access to SG and IPP. Distinct parts of the objective function, owing to the19
definition of SG, are revenue erosion, recovery as well as the cost of excess energy.20
Together with the quota mechanism for IPP, the combination of all profit components21
creates a connection trade-off between IPP and SG for networks with limited capacity.22
The effectiveness of the model is tested on 33- and 69-bus test distribution systems23
and compared to standard models that maximize generation capacity with predefined24
capacity diffusion. Simulation results demonstrate the model outperforms the standard25
models in satisfying the following binding constraints: minimum IPP capacity and SG26
net energy. It is further revealed that integrating SG and IPP with the proposed model27
increases profit by up to 23.7%, adding an improvement of 8% over a feasible standard28
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model.29
Keywords: Distribution company; distributed generation; distribution network; profit30
maximisation; quota obligation.31
1. Introduction32
Policy makers around the world are implementing measures to accelerate the connec-33
tion of renewable energy sources (RESs) in order to meet low carbon or sustainability34
objectives. As such, the number of countries that have some form of target setting for35
utilizing renewable energy has reached 164 as of 2015 [1]. Furthermore, 59 jurisdictions36
have targets that are legally binding. However, with increasing commitment comes con-37
cerns over the promotion of RESs. For example, distribution companies (DISCOs) risk38
losing profits while customers bear the cost of the related support schemes. Therefore,39
cost effective planning considering the locations and capacities of renewable distributed40
generation (DG) connections is necessary to deal with these key challenges.41
There are plenty of studies on the grid connection of new DG. Approaches described42
in [2–6], determine locations and sizes of DG units to optimize savings arising from43
deferral of network upgrades, losses, reliability, and other technical objectives. It is44
found in [7] and [8] that there are additional financial benefits of DG connection in45
the form of use-of-system charges, capacity and loss reduction incentives overseen by46
regulators.47
DG planning is carried out in diverse contexts [9–14]. In [9] the profit of a DISCO48
is maximized by strategic sizing and placement of third-party DG while maintaining49
project viability. This approach is in line with many instances whereby the DISCO50
coordinates generation by other producers [15], [16]. The models proposed in [10]51
and [11] minimize the cost of power purchased from generation companies (GENCOs),52
capital and operating costs of DG units owned by the DISCO, and the costs of network53
operation and unserved power. In [12], the objective is to maximize social welfare among54
DISCOs and GENCOs, and to maximize profit for the DG owner. The interaction55
between a DG owner and DISCO can also be treated as a bi-level problem whereby56
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the DG owners profits are maximized first, followed second by the DISCOs cost of57
energy [13]. The work presented in [14] models the role of a central planning authority58
aiming to encourage GENCOs and local DISCOs achieve predefined targets for RESs.59
The resulting incentives ensure viability of a mix of various technology investments.60
While the benefits of DG in distribution systems have been widely studied, there is61
a lack of focus on the implications of renewable energy policies from the DISCO’s per-62
spective concerning independent DG units. The formulation in [17] considers capacity63
expansion planning in the presence of renewable portfolio standards and carbon tax64
mechanisms. Another study investigates the impact of the aforementioned mechanisms65
plus feed-in tariffs (FiTs) and emission trading on expansion planning [18]. Although66
these models take environmental policies into account, they are solved from the per-67
spective of a GENCO. The impact of FiTs, carbon tax and cap-and-trade mechanisms68
on DG investments by DISCOs and independent investors is studied in [19], with the69
objective being to maximize the profit from the sale of energy.70
In practical settings, DG is categorized as independent power production (IPP)71
or self-generation (SG) [16]. IPP accounts for relatively large DG units that solely72
produce electricity, whereas SG represents existing customers seeking to invest in DG,73
with some energy being consumed on-site. IPP is promoted through a quota obligation74
scheme [20, 21]. The scheme requires that DISCOs supply a portion of their total75
load with RESs or make an alternative payment to a regulatory body. SG is typically76
supported by FiT incentive schemes. These schemes offer investors certainty through77
purchase of power at fixed rates and guaranteed payments over long periods [20, 22].78
The import and export variability of SG causes changes in revenue from energy sales,79
whereby revenue erosion is mitigated in several ways including revenue decoupling and80
lost revenue adjustment mechanisms [23–26]. That means DISCOs recoup the revenue81
lost due to SG integration from ratepayers. Hence, by promoting DG capacity and82
locations that maximize profit, the cost carried by ratepayers will be reduced. Under83
these circumstances, there are financial implications regarding any action the DISCO84
takes with respect to renewable DG integration. It is therefore crucial to distinguish85
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between IPP and SG.86
None of the referenced studies prescribes a model that considers binding RES quotas,87
the combined network impact of IPP and SG, and the cost and revenue implications88
for the DISCO in the context of DG location and capacity planning. Therefore, this89
paper incorporates both IPP and SG to develop an optimization model through which90
the DISCO enables network access for third-party DG, and responds strategically to91
renewable energy policy. Given RES quota, network and DG-specific constraints, the92
model presented herein determines locations and capacities that are allocated to SG93
and IPP such that the profit of the DISCO is maximized. Distinctly, the objective94
function encompasses a financial penalty for non-compliance, which varies mainly with95
IPP deployment, revenue erosion, a cost recovery mechanism for the lost revenue, and96
cost of energy exported from SG locations. The proposed model is validated on 33- and97
69-bus test distribution systems, and compared to standard approaches for maximizing98
overall DG capacity. Simulation results show there is a trade-off between SG and IPP99
integration, and that the proposed model provides advantages over standard approaches100
in terms of profit maximization and DG constraint satisfaction. In fact, the DISCO101
will achieve an increase of 23.7% in profits in the presence of constrained SG (net102
energy) and IPP (minimum capacity). This is an improvement of 8% over the standard103
approaches. Furthermore, the impact of each of the following parameters is analysed:104
renewable energy quota, SG net energy limit, revenue recovery rate, energy export rate,105
and minimum IPP capacity.106
The next section provides a description and mathematical model of a DISCO in-107
terested in profit maximisation in an policy environment promoting RESs integration.108
Section 3 describes case studies involving 33-bus and 69-bus test distribution systems.109
Results and analyses are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents conclusions that are110
drawn from the study.111
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2. DG Location and Capacity Planning Optimisation Model112
This section presents an optimisation model for DG location and capacity planning113
in terms of IPP and SG.114
2.1. Notation115
The notation defined below is employed for parameters and variables in the optimi-116
sation model.117
Sets and Indices118
119
d, j Bus indices
D Set consisting of all buses in the system
I Set consisting of all candidate IPP buses in the system
i Candidate IPP bus index
k Candidate SG bus index
K Set consisting of all candidate SG buses in the system
t Time interval index
τ Sampling interval of one hour
T Set consisting of all time intervals over the evaluation period
Parameters
Ce Wholesale price of electricity (£/MWh)
Cr Retail price of electricity (£/MWh)
ro Independent power production quota to be met by DISCO (%)
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Cb Penalty rate for obligation non-compliance (£/MWh)
Crv Revenue recovery rate (£/MWh)
Cee DISCO energy export rate (£/MWh)
aL Total allowed energy generation percentage for SG (%)
Gmax
sg,k Maximum allowable capacity for self-generation
Gmax
ipp,i Maximum allowable capacity for independent power production
Gmin
ipp,i Minimum allowable capacity for independent power production
Smaxd,j Apparent power limit of component between bus d and bus j
P t
sgl,k Active power demand associated with kth SG and tth time interval (MW)
P t
l,d Active power demand at dth bus and tth time interval (MW)
Qt
l,d Reactive power demand at dth bus and tth time interval (MVAr)
Gtdj Real part of admittance element between bus d and bus j (mho)
Btdj Imaginary part of admittance element between bus d and bus j (mho)
Variables
Gipp,i Generation capacity of the ith IPP
Gsg,k Generation capacity of the kth SG
P t
ipp,i Independent power production at ith candidate bus and tth time interval (MW)
P t
sg,k SG power at kth candidate bus and tth time interval (MW)
P ts Total active power delivered from substation (MW)
P t
g,d Active power supply at dth bus and tth time interval (MW)
Qt
g,d Reactive power supply at dth bus and tth time interval (MVAr)
V td , V
t
j Bus voltages magnitude at tth time interval (kV)
δtd, δ
t
j Bus voltage angles at tth time interval
The following sign function is defined to simplify the expression of connection and120
compliance statuses:121
sgn+(x) =

 1, if x > 0;0, if x ≤ 0. (1)122
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2.2. Problem Context123
In this problem, a DISCO owns and operates the distribution system and provides124
an electricity service to all its customers. However, the DISCO does not own candidate125
DG but manages its connection to the system. This section describes the DISCO’s126
financial benefits when evaluating potential IPP and SG connections, and proposes an127
optimal planning model to help the DISCO to determine what locations and capacities128
to promote as owners of IPP and SG seek access to the network. A central authority129
specifies DG eligibility criteria and a quota for RESs for a set period, which in this130
paper is one year.131
The financial benefit for IPP lies in income from energy production, while SG ben-132
efits from cost savings due to the reduction of energy consumption and income from133
energy production. Although the implementation and extent of compensation vary134
widely and depends on commercial arrangements, the overall structure takes the form135
of net metering or payments for energy produced and energy exported. In this pa-136
per, the DISCO incurs the cost of surplus energy that is exported to the distribution137
network.138
The framework for the location and capacity planning problem is illustrated in139
Fig. 1. The DISCO receives a mandate to integrate a certain amount of RES from a140
central authority. It can exercise several options to meet the quota requirement. The141
options are: accept full financial penalties and not connect renewable DG, combine DG142
connections and penalty payments, or fill quota through DG integration. Other inputs143
consist of price and cost parameters, and representative load and DG resource data.144
The objective is to maximize profit and in the process, ensure generation and network145
constraints are satisfied. The outputs of the model are the locations and capacities of146
IPP and SG. The next section provides a mathematical formulation of the proposed147
model.148
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Profit maximization
Generation constraints:
• Capacity limits
• DG class requirements
• Net energy limits
DG resources:
• IPP
• SG
External mandate:
• RES quota
Network constraints:
• Power-flow balance
• Voltage limits
• Thermal limits
• Power-flow direction
Parameter inputs:
• Wholesale energy price
• Retail energy price
• Revenue recovery rate
• Export energy rate
• Penalty rate
• Load data
Siting and sizing of
IPP and SG
Fig. 1. Proposed framework for DG location and capacity planning
2.3. Mathematical Formulation149
The objective of the DISCO is to maximize profit, defined in (2) as the revenue from150
the sale of energy minus the cost of energy and quota compliance.151
max JP = JD − JQ, (2)152
where JD is the gross profit from the sale of energy and incentives for revenue loss and153
SG energy export and JQ is the penalty payment for renewable energy shortfall. JD is154
defined as155
JD = µa + µb − µc + µd − µe. (3)156
Without SG, JD is simply the revenue from energy sales less the cost of wholesale157
energy (µa − µc). Components µb, µd and µb are introduced by the integration of SG158
with on-site energy use. Fig. 2 shows how each one captures the temporal interaction159
between on-site generation and load. The formulation of the different components is160
described in more detail in (4)–(10).161
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Fig. 2. Representation of SG impact through regions between load and generation curves
a) Energy Retail (µa). This is revenue from selling energy to consumers on the network,162
expressed as:163
µa = C
r
∑
t∈T
∑
d∈D
P t
l,dτ. (4)164
b) Revenue Erosion (µb). This term represents reduced revenue due to lower energy165
consumption at candidate SG locations (Fig. 2). The loss of revenue caused by SG166
is proportional to the local generation level. Of course, when local generation is zero167
at any SG site, true demand is revealed and the DISCO receives full income as is168
the case with pure load buses. To obtain µb we require the power difference between169
local load and generation at SG locations, PEk,t, which is given by (5).170
PEk,t = P
t
sgl,k − P
t
sg,k. (5)171
The above difference is translated into an energy import or export status, denoted172
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by the notation uek,t, and expressed by the sign of P
E
k,t as follows:173
uek,t := sgn
+(PEk,t). (6)174
Using (5) and (6) we finally obtain µb in (7) as175
µb = C
r
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
PEk,tτu
e
k,t. (7)176
c) Wholesale Energy Cost (µc). The DISCO purchases energy at the wholesale price,177
Ce from the substation and IPP to supply all loads not supplied by SG. This term178
represents the total wholesale energy cost and is given by (8).179
µc = C
e
∑
t∈T
(P ts +
∑
i∈I
P t
ipp,i)τ. (8)180
d) Revenue Recovery (µd). This term represents a revenue recovery mechanism, which181
is the proportion of the total revenue recovered after introducing SG to the system182
(Fig. 2). The costs are recovered from ratepayers or through other means available183
to the DISCO for dealing with revenue erosion. The expression for revenue recovery184
is written as:185
µd = C
rv
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
(
P t
sg,ku
e
k,t + P
t
sgl,k(1− u
e
k,t)
)
τ. (9)186
e) Energy Export Cost (µe). This term is the value the DISCO places on energy ex-187
ported by SG (Fig. 2). The resulting cost represents the DISCO’s partial contribu-188
tion to FiTs and is therefore not recovered from ratepayers.189
µe = C
ee
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
PEk,tτ(u
e
k,t − 1). (10)190
From (10), the unit cost of exported energy can differ from that in (8), depending191
on the value of Cee. For instance, if Cee = 0 a saving in wholesale energy cost is192
realized, once the SG capacity rises to levels whereby generation exceeds demand.193
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In contrast, Cee = Ce means the unit rates of energy from SG, IPP and upstream194
sources are all identical.195
The full mathematical expression for JD, written in (11), is composed of (4)–(10).196
JD = C
r
∑
t∈T
∑
d∈D
P t
l,dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
µa
+ Cr
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
PEk,tτu
e
k,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
µb
−Ce
∑
t∈T
(P ts +
∑
i∈I
P t
ipp,i)τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
µc
197
+ Crv
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
P t
sg,kτu
e
k,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
µd
−Cee
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
PEk,tτ(u
e
k,t − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
µe
. (11)198
The penalty payment, JQ, defined in (12), is required when total IPP capacity is lower199
than predefined quota, which is given as a percentage of the total energy delivered to200
consumers.201
JQ =
(
Cb
∑
t∈T
(
ro(
∑
d∈D
P t
l,d −
∑
k∈K
P t
sg,k)−
∑
i∈I
P t
ipp,i
)
τ
)
uc, (12)202
where the notation uc indicates whether or not the DISCO complies with the quota203
obligation, and is defined by the sign function sgn+ as:204
uc = sgn
+
(∑
t∈T
(
ro(
∑
d∈D
P t
l,d −
∑
k∈K
P t
sg,k)−
∑
i∈I
P t
ipp,i
)
τ
)
. (13)205
Of note, SG reduces the quota by decreasing the total energy on which the quota is206
based.207
The objective function (JP = JD−JQ) is maximized subject to the constraints (14)–208
(21), which are described below.209
1) SG Net Energy Limits. The total energy produced by SG is expressed in relation210
to local energy use over the evaluation period, permitting net consumers and net211
exporters. Local energy production from SG is therefore limited according to the212
given maximum allowable generation percentage aL using (14).213
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
P t
sg,k ≤ aL
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
P t
sgl,k. (14)214
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2) Power-flow Constraints. The total power consumption must be equal to the total215
power supply at each bus, maintaining power-flow balance over the tth interval216
according to (15) and (16).217
P t
g,d − P
t
l,d = V
t
d
D∑
j=1
V tj [G
t
dj cos (δ
t
d − δ
t
j)218
+Btdj sin (δ
t
d − δ
t
j)], (15)219
Qt
g,d −Q
t
l,d = V
t
d
D∑
j=1
V tj [G
t
dj sin (δ
t
d − δ
t
j)220
−Btdj cos (δ
t
d − δ
t
j)]. (16)221
3) Voltage Limits. The voltage at each bus must be maintained within the appropriate222
range, defined by (17), at all times.223
Vmin ≤ V td ≤ V
max. (17)224
4) Capacity Restrictions. SG capacity must be in the permitted range, according to225
(18).226
0 ≤ Gsg,k ≤ G
max
sg,k. (18)227
The IPP capacity constraint stems from a differentiating rule for SG and IPP. For228
an IPP connection to be allowed, its capacity must be higher than the upper limit229
for an SG. Therefore no single DG unit can be categorized as both an SG and an230
IPP. The requirement is considered by limiting IPP capacity using (19),231
Gmin
ipp,i ≤ Gipp,i ≤ G
max
ipp,i, (19)232
for Gipp,i > 0.233
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5) Thermal Limits. Thermal loading of lines and transformers must be less than the234
levels derived from manufacture ratings and safety regulations as in (20).235
(P t
2
d,j +Q
t2
d,j)
1/2
≤ Smaxd,j . (20)236
6) Reverse Power-flow Restriction. The power flow at the distribution substation must237
not be negative, meaning the distribution system must not export power upstream238
as in (21).239
P ts ≥ 0. (21)240
In summary, the location and capacity planning optimisation problem incorporating241
SG and IPP is formulated by maximizing profit, defined by (2), subject to constraints,242
(14)–(21).243
3. Case Studies244
The proposed optimisation model is applied to the 33- and 69-bus systems shown245
in Fig. 3 and 4, and the solutions are found by Matlab. Although the model is246
applicable to any generator categorized as SG or IPP, wind energy is the technology247
selected for all DG in the system for ease of illustration. Candidate buses for SG and248
IPP connections on the 33-bus system are 6, 13 and 28. The 69-bus system comprises249
potential connections at buses 7, 11, 21, 35, 45 and 61. SG-6 and SG-61 represent SG250
located at bus 6 and bus 61. The same convention is followed for IPP. The voltage251
variations at each bus of the distribution systems are expected to be within the range252
±5%. Detailed information of the 33-bus system can be found in [27] and that of the253
69-bus system in [28]. The 33-bus system is henceforth identified as Case A and the254
69-bus system, Case B. The maximum capacity for a single SG must be lower than 3255
MW, which is the minimum value for an IPP. Table 1 contains values of parameters256
which serve as inputs to the base-case simulation. Several other scenarios are created257
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Fig. 3. The 33-bus distribution system schematic diagram
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Fig. 4. The 69-bus distribution system in schematic form
mainly to quantify the performance of the proposed model in the event of parameter258
changes.259
4. Results and Discussion260
This section demonstrates the benefits of the proposed model, compares it to other261
approaches and ascertains its sensitivity to quota, net energy limit, incentives—these262
are revenue recovery and cost of exported energy—and minimum capacity variations.263
4.1. Result Comparisons264
Here, we benchmark the base-case simulation results of the proposed DG location265
and capacity optimisation model against those of other methods using parameter data266
from Table 1. The proposed model is compared with hybrid approaches consisting of267
a combination of optimisation and rule-based models. For the hybrid approaches, DG268
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Table 1
Parameter values for the base-case simulation
Wholesale price of electricity (Ce) 50 £/MWh
Retail price of electricity (Cr) 75 £/MWh
Penalty rate for non-compliance (Cb) 20 £/MWh
Revenue recovery rate (Crv) 0.5Cr £/MWh
DISCO energy export rate (Cee) 0.5Ce £/MWh
SG net energy limit (aL) 120%
IPP quota (ro) 23%
Minimum IPP capacity (Gmin
ipp,i) 3 MW
location and capacity are determined with a well-established method, which finds the269
maximum capacity to satisfy voltage and thermal constraints as in [29]. Because the270
method presents no DG segmentation, SG and IPP capacity shares are consequently271
apportioned according to predefined rules. For Approach A, DG is not deployed on272
the network. Approaches B – D correspond to the hybrid approaches composed of273
the method presented in [29] supplemented with defined rules for DG segmentation.274
Approach E employs the proposed DG location and capacity optimisation model. The275
description of the approaches considered is given below.276
Approach A (No DG): System remains free of DG in the presence of quota obligation.277
Approach B (IPP only): Find locations that maximize DG capacity. Allocate all of278
the capacity to IPP.279
Approach C (SG only): Find locations that maximize DG capacity. Allocate all of the280
capacity to SG.281
Approach D (Limited SG): Find locations that maximize DG capacity, limit SG in-282
tegration to 5% of load and allocate the remaining capacity to IPP. This approach283
reflects current practice in some jurisdictions such as California [30].284
Approach E: Apply proposed optimisation model to determine a combination of SG285
and IPP at different locations, which maximizes profit.286
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Table 2 presents a summary of the results of the various approaches for DG location287
and capacity planning. Evidently, Approaches B – D produce low profits, constraint288
violations and inconsistent performance. The main reason for the constraint violations289
is that only one location yields maximum DG capacity in all these approaches. That290
is, bus 6 in Case A and bus 61 in Case B. In contrast, the proposed model (Approach291
E) maximizes profit with respect to all the stated constraints, (14) – (21), without any292
violations. In Case A, only Approach A, B and E produce feasible results. Approach293
C offers the highest profit but the concentration of SG at a single location (bus 6)294
results in a violation of the limit for SG net energy. It is apparent that Approach E295
satisfies all constraints and carries increased profit simultaneously. Compared to the296
system without SG and IPP, the profit is raised by 23.7% to £1.692m. Similar results297
are found in Case B, where another constraint—the minimum IPP capacity limit—is298
violated. The reason for the violation is that there is insufficient network capacity299
(1.221 MW) to satisfy the minimum requirement for IPP capacity (3 MW). Notably,300
for this case the highest infeasible profit belongs to Approach B. It is thus observed301
that none of Approaches B – D is unable to satisfy all constraints and maximize profit302
in both Case A and B. These results highlight discrepancies that can be expected when303
there is no inherent representation of SG and IPP within DG planning models. It is304
apparent that Approach E is the only one that provides feasible profit maximisation.305
If the SG net energy and minimum IPP capacity limits are not binding, the results306
of Approaches B – D will become feasible. Tables 3 and 4 show the comparison of all the307
approaches when these constraints are removed. The results also include lack of recovery308
of lost revenue (Crv = 0) following network integration of SG in both the partially and309
fully constrained scenarios. As expected, Approach E has the highest profit in the310
partially constrained scenarios for Cases A and B. It is also, yet again, the only feasible311
approach to provide the highest profits in the fully constrained scenario. Furthermore,312
it improves the result of Approach C in Case B by 8%. The corresponding profit313
breakdown of the two approaches is plotted in Fig. 5. It can be seen that Approach E314
suffers less revenue erosion, with lower energy export cost. This is due to the fact that315
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Approach E allocates SG capacity to more locations than Approach C (Table 4).
Table 2
Comparison of location and capacity allocation approaches
Case A Case B
Approach JP (£×10
3) Violated const. JP (£×10
3) Violated const.
A 1367.996 None 332.047 None
B 1676.466 None 406.920 min. IPP capacity
C 1839.303 SG net energy 350.856 None
D 1698.830 SG net energy 392.527 min. IPP capacity
E 1692.445 None 352.129 None
316
4.2. Sensitivity Analyses317
In this section, the results of the proposed optimisation model in the presence of318
parameter changes are analysed.319
4.2.1. Quota320
The values of ro are systematically changed from 10% to 35%. All other parameters321
maintain the values in Table 1.322
Case A: Fig. 6 shows the share of each DG category in Case A. The financial323
implications of the quota adjustments can be seen in Fig. 7. Quotas between 0 and 20%324
are easily met without filling up network capacity, hence the penetration of SG at all325
candidate locations is limited by the local net energy limits. Over the same quota range,326
the profit remains unchanged because the penalty payment for non-compliance is not327
imposed. It is suggested that the potential loss of revenue due to SG connection coupled328
with revenue recovery and energy export benefits do not maximize profit at a quota329
of 25% (4.921 MW). Despite the fact that maximum network capacity is 5.148 MW,330
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Table 3
Comparison of location and capacity allocation approaches (Crv = 0)
Partially constrained (excl. minimum IPP capacity and SG net energy limits)
Case A
Approach JP (£×10
3) SG MW (Bus) IPP MW (Bus)
A 1367.996 1367.996 0
B 1676.466 0 5.1481 (6)
C 1823.355 5.1481 (6) 0
D 1685.659 0.7268 (6) 4.4212 (6)
E 1823.355 5.1481 (6) 0
Fully constrained
Case A
Approach JP (£×10
3) SG MW (Bus) IPP MW (Bus) Violated const.
A 1367.996 0 0 None
B 1676.466 0 5.1481 (6) None
C — 5.1481 (6) 0 SG net energy
D — 0.7268 (6) 4.4212 (6) SG net energy
E 1678.045 0.0905 (13), 0.6032 (28) 4.3679 (6) None
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Table 4
Comparison of location and capacity allocation approaches (Crv = 0)
Partially constrained (excl. minimum IPP capacity and SG net energy limits)
Case B
Approach JP (£×10
3) SG MW (Bus) IPP MW
A 332.047 0 0
B 406.920 0 1.221 (61)
C 316.085 1.221 0
D 382.344 0.239 (61) 0.982 (61)
E 442.450 0.4842 (7), 0.7365 (45) 0
Fully constrained
Case B
Approach JP (£×10
3) SG MW (Bus) IPP MW (Bus) Violated const.
A 332.047 0 0 None
B — 0 1.221 (61) min. IPP capacity
C 316.085 1.221 (61) 0 None
D — 0.2389 (61) 0.9821 (61) min. IPP capacity
E 341.359
0.0609 (7),
0 None
0.2186 (11)
0.1719 (21)
0.0090 (35)
0.0591 (45)
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Fig. 5. Breakdown of DISCO profit
with 0.227 MW (5.148 MW − 4.921 MW) is unused, there is a clear lack of SG (Fig.331
6). As a result recovered revenue and cost of exported energy fall to zero. Eventually,332
beyond the 25% quota, IPP integration reaches maximum network capacity – 35% quota333
equals 6.89 MW, which is higher than the maximum available capacity of 5.148 MW.334
The increasing deficit also increases the penalty payment and therefore reduces profit.335
The reason for the lack of IPP capacity at bus 13 and bus 28 can be traced back336
to the IPP capacity restriction in (19). IPP is connected only if it meets the minimum337
capacity requirement of 3 MW or higher. Allocating capacity to IPP at three different338
locations uses up at least 9 MW of capacity, which is significantly higher than the339
maximum network capacity.340
Case B: The allocation of network location and capacity using the proposed model341
manifests two clear patterns in Case B, which represent repeated allocations as the342
quota is varied. These patterns are labelled Variation A and B and are shown in343
Fig. 8. Through Variation A the model distributes capacity among multiple buses,344
and through Variation B, it assigns all network capacity to a single bus. The highest345
available network capacity is 1.221 MW regardless of parameter changes. Since the346
minimum capacity limit for IPP is 3 MW, it is again not possible to connect IPP.347
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Fig. 6. DG location and capacity for Case A under quota adjustments
Therefore 100% of available capacity is allocated to SG. Variation A is produced for348
quotas below 30%. Variation B, which provides additional 0.52 MW over variation A,349
is selected for quota requirements in excess of 30%. Profit from the sale of energy and350
incentives, JD, is calculated as £418,861 for Variation A and £406,595 for Variation351
B. However, Variation B suffers less penalties (JQ) because of higher capacity. The352
penalty payment generally increases with rising quota, as seen in Fig. 7. It is found353
that Variation A causes relatively small differences (JP ) between JD and JQ at quotas354
of 25% and below but higher differences for quotas above 25% compared to Variation B.355
For example, at the quota of 15%, JP for variation B is £370,243. As seen in Fig. 7, JP356
for Variation A is clearly higher at £375,340. For a quota of 30%, Variation A produces357
£331,816 for JP whereas Variation B yields £333,891, which is the value displayed in358
Fig. 7. This is how the model allocates capacity – by selecting Variation A for quotas359
below 25%, and Variation B for quotas above 25%.360
4.2.2. Net Energy Limit361
The SG net energy limit supply is altered in steps of 20% from 60% to 200% of362
local demand. Limits below 100% imply that SG units are not allowed to generate363
more energy than they consume while higher limits permit supply in excess of local364
consumption.365
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Case A: The impacts of the SG net energy limit on capacity and financial flows are366
shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. In general, restricting SG energy output to levels below367
local consumption is not as profitable for the DISCO as allowing net energy export,368
assuming other parameters in Table 1 remain unchanged. Net energy limits around369
60% and below render SG unprofitable, hence network capacity is solely allocated to370
IPP (Fig. 9). Some capacity remains in these situations because the fixed quota of 23%371
is less than available network capacity. However, the additional capacity is allocated372
to IPP since there is no upper cap for the quota mechanism. As a result there is a373
high level of compliance when it comes to the quota obligation mechanism. When the374
SG net energy limit is relaxed, more capacity is allocated to SG and the DISCO profit375
increases in return (Fig. 10). However, SG is deployed at bus 6 but displaced at other376
buses when the limit reaches 140% (Fig. 9). The explanation for this change is that377
SG at one location can export more energy to the network at a cost of 0.5Ce without378
a significant further reduction of revenue from energy sales. Once the net energy limit379
exceeds 160%, SG begins displacing IPP, causing activation of the penalty charge for380
quota non-compliance (Fig. 9 and 10).381
Case B: Financial results for Case B are shown in Fig. 10, with the corresponding382
capacity details presented in Fig. 11. The connection of IPP is ruled out by the mini-383
mum limit of 3 MW (Table 1), so all network capacity is allocated to SG. Consequently,384
raising the net energy limit has an immediate effect of decreasing the penalty payment385
for quota non-compliance (Fig. 10). Sharing of capacity between all candidate locations386
is varied to produce an almost linearly rising profit as the net energy limit is increased.387
388
4.2.3. Revenue Recovery and Energy Export Rate389
Fig. 12 and 13 show variations of financial performance in response to changing390
recovery and DISCO export rates for Case A and Case B. JQ1, JQ2 and JQ3 represent391
penalty payments corresponding to export rates of Cee, 0.5Cee and 0, respectively. The392
same export rates apply for numbered subscripts relating to JP , µd and µe.393
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Case A: Based on Fig. 12, the DISCO remains compliant and incurs no financial394
penalty at the export rates of Cee and 0.5Cee. When the export rate is 0, the penalty395
payment increases to £31,251. In general, profit rises proportionally with the revenue396
recovery rate unless the export rate is equal to the retail price. In this case the profit397
is constant for all values of Crv from zero up to Ce.398
Case B: The DISCO is unable to avoid the penalty payment regardless of revenue399
recovery and export rates adjustments because the maximum network capacity is less400
than the prescribed IPP capacity (Fig 13). The highest penalty values are observed at401
the revenue recovery rates below Ce. In contrast, the total revenue recovery and energy402
export payment increase as the revenue recovery rate rise to 0.5Ce and above. As in403
Case A, the highest profit is encountered when the revenue recovery rate equals the404
wholesale price and the export rate is zero.405
4.2.4. Minimum IPP Capacity Limit406
The adjustments of the minimum capacity restriction for IPP are realized by mod-407
ifying Gmin
ipp,i in (19). This constraint affects how much DG capacity is allocated to IPP408
and SG, as shown in Table 5 for both Cases A and B.409
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]Table 5
Impact of restricting IPP capacity
Case A
IPP limit (MW) JP (£×10
3) SG (MW) IPP (MW)
≥ 4 1692.445 0.6937 4.37
≥ 5 1676.466 0 5
≥ 6 1418.1 1.2969 0
Case B
IPP limit (MW) JP (£×10
3) SG (MW) IPP (MW)
≥ 1 408.63 0.22 1
≥ 1.22 406.92 0 1.22
≥ 2 352.129 1.068 0
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Case A: Any value of Gipp,i that exceeds the quota specification removes the fi-410
nancial penalty for the DISCO as long as system constraints are satisfied. Given the411
network constraints (17), (20) and (21), raising the lower limit to 6 MW makes IPP412
connections. This is because the maximum DG capacity on the network is 5.148 MW.413
At all candidate locations, maximum SG capacity is reached, amounting to a total of414
1.297 MW (Table 5). In other words, the binding constraint for SG is the net energy415
limit. As a result, it is observed that raising the net energy limit will result in more416
use of network capacity by SG in the absence of IPP.417
Case B: As seen in Table 5, IPP connection is only made possible by much lower418
capacity restrictions. An apparent issue in the preceding analyses is that, Case B has419
insufficient capacity for IPP at 3 MW and above. However, it does opens up to IPP420
at limits of 1 MW and below. In fact, the observation is that, to ensure that capacity421
is allocated to both IPP and SG in the two cases, the minimum limit must be set at422
1.22 MW or lower. Therefore relaxation of the minimum capacity cap encourages better423
diffusion of network capacity.424
4.3. Application to Renewable Energy Programmes425
The utility of the proposed model can be viewed from the perspectives of the DISCO426
and the regulator. For the DISCO, the model provides the capability to guide decisions427
of investors by releasing information and incentives for connection opportunities that428
increase or preserve profits. As discussed, the DISCO can maximize profit given varying429
regulatory conditions. However, revenue recovery and discounted export cost will lead430
to increased prices for ratepayers. Therefore, the results of the model must also carry431
relevance for regulation. Consequently, the profit of the DISCO must not be too low432
to discourage DG integration, nor be excessively high, which can lead to a substantial433
increase in profits at the ratepayers’ expense.434
There are other ways in which the model can be used in this context. During the435
design of renewable energy programmes, the model can assist in deciding the limits436
of minimum IPP capacity and SG net energy. The minimum limit for IPP can have437
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the effect of displacing either IPP or SG. If the limit is too high, IPP investors will be438
subjected to high costs of connection and delays due to the requirements for network439
reinforcement or access higher voltage levels. A high net energy limit can lead to440
concentration of SG at few locations. This means that only few DISCO customers will441
be able to obtain network access, further undermining the roll-out of RESs.442
5. Conclusion443
In this paper, an optimal DG location and capacity planning model is proposed444
in which DG is separated into IPP and SG in accordance with the requirements of445
practical policy schemes such as quota obligation and FiT. The unique capability of446
the proposed optimisation model is that the DISCO will be able to integrate IPP and447
SG into distribution networks without relying on predefined rules. In particular, it is448
shown that the DISCO gains the capability to conduct location and capacity evaluations449
for these DG categories, in support of profit maximization. The obligation to meet450
renewable energy quota and the import-export impact of SG are embedded within the451
model. This ensures the most favourable financial position for the DISCO, considering452
the trade-off between penalty payment and RES connection. Furthermore, financial453
aspects specific to SG connection – revenue erosion, recovery and energy export cost are454
considered to complete the objective function. Unlike standard models with predefined455
rules for IPP and SG deployment, the model presented in this paper is able to satisfy456
constraints unique to each DG category while maximising profit. Notably, the standard457
models violate SG net energy and IPP capacity limits because the import and export458
capability of SG as well as the lower bound of IPP capacity are not taken into account.459
In contrast, the proposed model enables facilitation of IPP and SG connections while460
raising profits by up to 23.7% without violating any constraints. It is also demonstrated461
using the obtained model, that changes in renewable energy quota, net energy limit and462
other parameters cause variations in location and distribution of capacity between IPP463
and SG as profit is maximized.464
30
References465
[1] IRENA, Renewable Energy Target Setting (2015).466
[2] A. Piccolo, P. Siano, Evaluating the impact of network investment deferral on distributed467
generation expansion, IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 24 (3) (2009) 1559–1567.468
[3] M. F. Shaaban, Y. M. Atwa, E. F. El-Saadany, DG allocation for benefit maximizationin469
distribution networks, IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 28 (2) (2013) 639–649.470
[4] T. Niknam, S. I. Taheri, J. Aghaei, S. Tabatabaei, M. Nayeripour, A modified honey471
bee mating optimization algorithm for multiobjective placement of renewable energy472
resources, Applied Energy 88 (2011) 4817–4830.473
[5] M. A. Abdullah, A. P. Agalgaonkar, K. M. Muttaqi, Assessment of energy supply and474
continuity of service in distribution network with renewable distributed generation, Ap-475
plied Energy 113 (2014) 1015–1026.476
[6] D. Q. Hung, N. Mithulananthan, R. C. Bansal, An optimal investment planning frame-477
work for multiple distributed generation units in industrial distribution systems, Applied478
Energy 124 (2014) 62–72.479
[7] G. P. Harrison, A. Piccolo, A. R. Wallace, Exploring the tradeoffs between incentives480
for distributed generation developers and DNOs, IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 22 (2) (2007)481
821–828.482
[8] G. Harrison, A. Piccolo, P. Siano, A. R. Wallace, Hybrid ga and opf evaluation of network483
capacity for distributed generation connections, Elect. Power Syst. Res. 78 (3) (2008)484
392–398.485
[9] H. A. Hejazi, A. R. Araghi, B. Vahidi, S. H. Hosseinian, M. Abedi, H. Mohsenian-Rad,486
Independent distributed generation planning to profit both utility and DG investor, IEEE487
Trans. Power Syst. 28 (2) (2013) 1170–1178.488
[10] W. El-Khattam, K. Bhattacharya, Y. Hegazy, M. M. A. Salama, Optimal investment489
planning for distributed generation in a competitive electricity market, IEEE Trans.490
Power Syst. 19 (3) (2004) 1674–1684.491
31
[11] K. M. Muttaqi, A. D. T. Le, J. Aghaei, E. Mahboubi-Moghaddam, M. Negnevitsky,492
G. Ledwich, Optimizing distributed generation parameters through economic feasibility493
assessment, Applied Energy 165 (2016) 893–903.494
[12] D. Gautam, N. Mithulananthan, Optimal DG placement in deregulated electricity mar-495
ket, Elect. Power Syst. Res. 77 (12) (2007) 1627–1636.496
[13] J. M. Lo´pez-Lezama, J. Contreras, A. Padilha-Feltrin, Location and contract pricing of497
distributed generation using a genetic algorithm, Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst. 36 (1)498
(2012) 117–126.499
[14] I. Das, K. Bhattacharya, C. Can˜izares, Optimal incentive design for targeted penetration500
of renewable energy sources, IEEE Trans. Sustain. Energy 5 (4) (2014) 1213–1225.501
[15] California Public Utilities Code, Distributed Energy Resources, Available:502
http://goo.gl/vjAU8N.503
[16] BC Hydro, About independent power projects, Available: https://goo.gl/JQWZgM.504
[17] H. Park, R. Baldick, Stochastic generation capacity expansion planning reducing green-505
house gas emissions, IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 30 (2) (2015) 1026–1034.506
[18] F. Careri, C. Genesi, P. Marannino, M. Montagna, S. Rossi, I. Siviero, Generation ex-507
pansion planning in the age of green economy, IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 26 (4) (2011)508
2214–2223.509
[19] S. Wong, K. Bhattacharya, D. Fuller, Long-term effects of feed-in tariffs and carbon taxes510
on distribution systems, IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 25 (3) (2010) 1241–1253.511
[20] S. Abolhosseini, A. Heshmati, The main support mechanisms to finance renewable energy512
development, Renew. Sustain. Energy. Rev. 40 (2014) 876–885.513
[21] P. Menanteau, D. Finon, M.-L. Lamy, Prices versus quantities: choosing policies for514
promoting the development of renewable energy, Energy Policy 31 (2003) 799–812.515
32
[22] N. Aparicio, I. MacGill, J. R. Abbad, H. Beltran, Comparison of wind energy support516
policy and electricity market design in Europe, the United States, and Australia, IEEE517
Trans. Sustain. Energy 3 (3) (2012) 809–818.518
[23] E. McKenna, M. Thomson, Photovoltaic metering configurations, feed-in tariffs and the519
variable effective electricity prices that result, IET Renew. Power. Gener. 7 (3) (2013)520
235–245.521
[24] S. H. Oliva, I. MacGill, R. Passey, Assessing the short-term revenue impacts of residential522
PV systems on electricity customers, retailers and network service providers, Renew.523
Sustain. Energy. Rev. 54 (2016) 1494–1505.524
[25] E. Hirst, C. Goldman, Key issues in integrated resource planning for electric utilities,525
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 5 (4) (1990) 1105–1253.526
[26] A. Satchwell, A. Mills, G. Barbose, Regulatory and ratemaking approaches to mitigate527
financial impacts of net-metered PV on utilities and ratepayers, Energy Policy 85 (2015)528
115–125.529
[27] B. E. Baran, F. F. Wu, Network reconfiguration in distribution systems for loss reduction530
and load balancing, IEEE Trans. Power Del. 4 (2) (1989) 1401–1407.531
[28] B. E. Baran, F. F. Wu, Optimal capacitor placement on radial distribution systems,532
IEEE Trans. Power Del. 4 (1) (1989) 725–734.533
[29] G. N. Koutroumpezis, A. S. Safigianni, Optimum allocation of the maximum possible534
distributed generation penetration in a distribution network, Elect. Power Syst. Res.535
80 (12) (2010) 1421–1427.536
[30] J. Heeter, R. Gelman, L. Bird, Status of Net Metering: Assessing the Potential to Reach537
Program Caps, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) (2010).538
33
